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Abstract 
The paper provides a cursory analysis of the methodological problems of coding policy influence in ATLAS.ti. In a 
series of notes on a research project on Hungarian banking, the measuring problems of preference attainment are 
considered in the context of lobbying in developed democracies. Two such issues are discussed in more detail: The 
identification of policy issues in large-sized corpora (as well as their relative importance), and the estimation of 
relevant policy positions regarding these important issues. For the first point, the flexible coding schemes as well as 
grouping and commenting features of ATLAS.ti contribute to a proper identification of policy issues and their re­
spective boundaries. For the second point, it is asserted that the estimation of lobby group and government policy 
positions is best assisted by the quotation managing, query and co-occurrence functions of the software. The dis­
cussion of this case study in applied qualitative data analysis also reveals the strong dependence of research results 
not only on appropriate research rules and procedures but also the transparency thereof. 
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Introduction 
The paper provides a cursory analysis of the methodological problems of coding the influence of lobby  
groups on public policy outcomes in developed democracies. The general field of business and politics, as  
well as lobbying research in political science puts a premium on novel results gained from the empirical 
measurement of political  clout of various interest groups on all  levels  of government policy-making. 
However, the presentation of these results is often disjointed from a detailed exposition of the process of 
inquiry itself, so as to suggest that the procedures leading to these results are inherently uncontroversial. 
In fact, it is important to note that these results may be somewhat dependent on the actual coding  
strategies and process undertaken by scholars (see the problems related to inter-coder reliability, for in­
stance).  Furthermore,  a  detailed  demonstration  of  researchers'  decisions  related  to  the  coding  and 
grouping of the underlying material may shed light not only on the internal validity of these studies but  
may also serve as a stepping stone for future projects facing similar stumbling blocks. This task here is 
undertaken by an analysis of the methodological problems encountered during the preparation of a case 
study on Hungarian banking. The original project addressed a puzzle of Hungarian policy history: the 
apparently diminishing influence of the Hungarian Banking Association (HBA), the pre-eminent lobbying 
organization of domestic and international banking interests in the country. 
In order to confirm (or refute) this hypothesis, a computer-assisted coding and content analysis of rele­
vant  corpora  had  been  undertaken.  Throughout  the  process  problems  requiring  careful  attention 
emerged in each step leading to a near-constant stream of analytic decisions. This paper briefly highlights 
a small selection of such methodological issues that seem to be inherent to empirical analyses of policy 
influence in particular,  and qualitative data analysis in general.  The presentation is also illustrated by 
screenshots and examples of the ATLAS.ti toolkit. 
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In the following, first an overview is provided of the relevant methodological literature. Second, insights 
are presented from the coding process of the Hungarian project on banking sector lobbying. The final  
section concludes. 
Methodological Literature 
The assessment of the policy influence of political actors poses problems even for seasoned empirical so­
cial scientists. For starters, a number of competing conceptualizations are in circulation for an issue that 
has  variously  been  labelled  as  "bargaining  success" (Cross,  2013;  Weiler,  2012;  Rasmussen  & Reh, 
2013), "interest group success" or "lobbying success" (Bernhagen, Dür & Marshall,  2014), "interest 
group preference attainment" (Bunea, 2013), "agenda setting influence" (Binderkrantz & Rasmussen, 
2015),  "bargaining power" (Bailer,  2010),  "lobbying winners  and losers"  (Kim,  Urpelainen & Yang, 
2014), "who gets what" (Bernhagen, 2012) or "how powerful they are" (Dür, 2008b). 
Two, sometimes interconnected, strands of the literature are discernible from this terminological multi­
tude. Some studies approach influence in terms of the power to frame debates according to interests.  
The occurrence of "frame congruence" between lobbyists and politicians (Boräng & Naurin, 2015) is 
considered to be evidence of interest group success. This line of research focuses on media reports, 
speeches and discourses in general (Boräng et al., 2014; De Bruycker & Beyers, 2015). In contrast to 
these communication-based studies, a second approach focuses on policies. Here "positional proximity" 
of policy stances is considered in what is called a spatial modelling context (Bernhagen, Dür & Marshall, 
2015; Dür, 2008a: 566). 
Besides these thematic differences, and notwithstanding the empirical sources of research, at least three 
strands of the literature may be delineated from a strictly  methodological  point of view. Dür (2008a: 
559) distinguishes "three broad approaches to measuring interest group influence: process-tracing, as­
sessing ‘attributed influence'  and gauging the degree  of  preference  attainment."  Each of  these ap­
proaches has its strengths and shortcomings (for a comparison see: Jesus, 2010). 
For our present purposes, the literature on preference attainment offers the best match with its emphasis 
on replicability, its potential for generalization, and its capability of the detection of behind-the-curtain  
lobbying actions (or their results, to be more specific). During this type of a research process "political 
controversies are modeled spatially and each actor involved can be placed on a point of a policy scale to 
represent the position that it favors (while) by comparing the policy outcome with the policy preferences 
of  interest  groups,  one  can draw conclusions  about  the winners  and  losers  of  the decision-making 
process" (Klüver, 2012: 62). 
Even as the preference attainment approach seemed a good match for our thesis regarding the diminish­
ing influence of the HBA, the measurement of preference attainment is considered a hard nut to crack 
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even by scholars of the subject. Pedersen (2013) ponders whether measuring interest group influence is  
a "mission impossible," whereas Dür (2008a) makes the case for a triangulation of various approaches. 
With the maturation of the preference attainment research programme, however, some methodological 
concerns have been mitigated either via the extended use of expert interviews or quantitative content  
analysis techniques. 
As for the first option, Bernhagen, Dür & Marshall  (2014: 16) construct a measure called "Success" 
which relies "on the idea that an actor is more successful, the more it manages to pull the outcome clos ­
er to its ideal point relative to the reversion point" (this latter refers to status quo in most cases). Dür and 
his aforementioned colleagues went on to apply this methodology to a "data set containing the positions 
of 1,043 non-state actors on 112 controversial issues included in 70 different legislative proposals intro­
duced by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010." The respective spatial positions were de­
rived from interviews with "European Commission officials that had particular responsibilities for the rele­
vant  legislative  proposal  at  the time of  its  initiation and who command detailed  knowledge of  the 
negotiations that took place at this time" (Bernhagen, Dür & Marshall, 2015: 12). Besides such elite in­
terviews, surveys are also a favored tool of data collection in lobbying research (Marchetti, 2015). 
Klüver (2012: 4) took a different approach to EU-level lobbying success. She applied quantitative text  
analysis techniques to the corpus of "online consultations launched by the European Commission." She 
extracted the policy preferences of interest groups from their consultation submissions and compared 
them with the policy outcome (for a methodological debate regarding the merit of this approach see 
Klüver [2009; 2015] and her critics [Bunea & Ibeskas, 2015]). In a mini case study of two competing  
algorithms and hand-coding she concludes that "the policy position estimates obtained by the three 
techniques correlate highly and therefore largely cross-validate each other" (Klüver, 2012: 90). In a simi­
lar vein, Zhiru & Zhiqiang (2013) apply quantitative text analysis to measure the policy influence of think  
tanks in the field of environmental policy in the U.S. 
In the final analysis Klüver (2012: 91-92) opts for an algorithm-based technique called Wordfish, as she 
considers hand-coding to be "only useful if one or just a few issues are studied since it is very time-con­
suming and cost-intensive." Besides presenting the underlying methodological problems of coding policy 
influence in general, the other purpose of this paper is to prove that qualitative data analysis by hand-
coding may be a viable alternative to quantitative text analysis for selected research questions. 
As it will be shown below the number of issues is, in fact, not a prohibitive problem for this type of re­
search, especially if hand-coding is supported by computer-aided qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) 
software such as ATLAS.ti. This is true even as Klüver (2012: 67) is right to point out that "whereas  
hand-coding claims validity as its central advantage over computerized text analysis, the content analysis  
approach of [the Comparative Manifestos Project, one of the most extensive project of this kind] has 
been severely criticized for a number of reasons." In the next two sections we consider the potential ad­
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vantages and pitfalls of the computer-aided manual coding of policy influence along with procedures for 
countering these shortcomings and improving research validity and reliability. 
Using ATLAS.ti For Coding Policy Influence 
Studies of the preference attainment of European financial lobby groups are few and far between despite 
their importance in shaping legislation with wide-ranging consequences for both consumers of financial 
services and the taxpayer in general (for a recent exception see Pritoni, 2014). 
Our decision to use ATLAS.ti was rooted in its unique features facilitating the mass hand-coding of offi ­
cial documents, legislative texts and news items and also its analytical tools. In this we followed a similar­
ly methods-oriented study by Friese (2011) on the financial crisis. She conducted a descriptive/initial cod­
ing of various materials related to the financial calamity and also a "build-up" towards analysis (e.g.: her 
"consequences  of  the  crisis"  is  similar  to  the  "policy  outcomes"  variable  of  this  project).  In  our 
investigation of the policy influence of the Hungarian Banking Association we also partly relied on the 
research design for hand coding by Klüver (2012: 74—as discussed above). 
The research question for the project was motivated by a puzzle of Hungarian economic policy: the ap­
parently diminishing influence of banking interests after 2010. This question was examined by opera­
tionalizing policy influence as preference attainment. The research design then compared the lobbying 
power of the HBA during the government cycles before and after the 2010 elections which, arguably,  
ushered in a new era of anti-finance politics with the victory of the right-wing Fidesz party. 
This comparison of the 2006-2010 and 2010-2014 periods was undertaken in three steps. The first step 
entailed a content analysis of Hungarian Banking Association (HBA) press releases, with the aim of estab­
lishing the ideal policy positions of the association. The second step concerned the self-assessment by the 
HBA of the success of its lobbying activities as presented in its yearly reports. The final step featured a  
comparison of preference attainment before and after the 2010 elections based on these two sources 
along with a discussion of the results. The resulting analysis offers guidance regarding the winners and 
losers of decision-making in the domain of financial policy in the given period. During this process a 
number of methodological issues had to be resolved—in what follows we discuss two of these with illus­
trations from the pertinent ATLAS.ti workflow. The first problem concerns identifying policy issues from 
various sources and over time. The second is connected to the estimation of spatial positions of actors in 
a two-dimensional policy space. 
Identifying Policy Issues 
Provided the textual sources of inquiry are settled on, the first actual task of content analysis is identify ­
ing the units of analysis. In this case extant literature is unambiguous in its reliance on policy issues (such  
as the subprime crisis following the bailout of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the 
U.S. in 2008) as the cornerstone of empirical analysis. Nevertheless, policy issues are less well behaved as 
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policy topics, such as economic policy or financial regulation (to name just two related to the policy issue 
of the subprime crisis). Taken together these latter constitute a closed universe of policy domains for any 
given period (and they are also relatively stable over time, except for dramatic technological changes 
such as the emergence of telecommunication and its regulation in the 20th century). 
Policy issues, on the other hand, are not finite and not stable over time. Any given number of issues may 
materialize in a policy domain at the same time: Various proposals for establishing tuition in higher edu­
cation may constitute separate policy issues, just as the wage demands of lecturers or foreign student 
visas may come to the fore of the debate the very same month. Also, some issues come and go while  
others are more permanent. All this results in a dynamic evolution of the issue space with a constantly 
changing population of issues and their respective salience. These features put a premium on researchers' 
decisions (as opposed to policy topic analysis).  
Furthermore, policy issues are less susceptible to exploration through data mining: In contrast with  rela­
tively stable policy domain titles, their labels may be variegated and idiosyncratic. Basic methods of word  
or phrase extraction, therefore, may not yield useful results (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The limitations of the bag of words method
Figure 1 shows the results for the application of the ATLAS.ti Word Cruncher module to a corpus of an­
nual HBA reports (English language). Even if we exclude non-necessary stop words, the more frequent 
words only reveal the policy topic in question (this is—to some extent—also true of expressions). Recur­
ring terms such as "banks," "financial," or "European" are simply not indicative of policy issues. 
Moreover, digging deeper only compounds this problem. Even a cursory analysis of Association press re­
leases revealed that direct reference to salient issues as they were labeled or framed by the media, or 
public discourse was simply non-existent. Government proposals were referred to in legislative terms or 
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by allusions to the underlying policy topic. All in all, reading HBA yearly reports and press releases was 
akin to reading between the lines of diplomatic cables. The daily business of media and politics on the  
one hand, and lobbying on the other hand are conducted in different "dialects"—and the translation is 
not always an easy task. The conversion requires the skills  of the researcher. As this methodological  
problem was not related to natural language processing or word clusters in a corpus,  manual coding was 
selected as the preferred method over machine learning techniques (such as Wordfish) for the diverse 
data sources of the research design. 
These considerations lead us to the next task of identifying policy issues in extended masses of text by 
hand-coding. The first prerequisite for such an undertaking is a working definition of a policy issue. In  
this we followed Baumgartner et al. (2009: 1-3) and designated all policy problems and proposals for so­
lutions as policy issues which are considered as such by the relevant lobbying organizations (in our case  
the HBA, and its press releases and yearly reports). Second, a multi-round process of coding and code­
book revision was necessary in order to adjust for the peculiarities of the material at hand. As we did not  
have a preexisting list of issues an inductive approach was followed. We started out with a "descrip tive-
level analysis" during which "noticing" was the main task, which was followed by a conceptual phase 
(Friese, 2014:17-18). Figure 2 presents a screenshot of the coding process by highlighting various code 
groups (including "policy issues", "lobby action" and the sentiment variable of "policy outcome")
Figure 2: Assigning codes to text segments in ATLAS.ti
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This coding process underlined the necessary attributes of policy issues to be searched for during coding, 
both  also  led  to  further  methodological  problems.  The  two  most  important  of  these  were  issue 
boundaries and issue salience. 
Starting with the former, the delimitation of issues proved to be a less than straightforward task. Figure 3 
provides a snapshot of an intermediate phase between the initial code-list and a grouped code list for 
policy issues (as derived from press releases for the period 2008-2014). 
Figure 3: The issues codebook with the groundedness indicator in ATLAS.ti
The first item on this list already highlights the difficulties of defining policy issues. A primary decision re­
lates to multiple or exclusive coding of quotes in ATLAS.ti. Reality defies simple conceptual schemes in 
this respect: Words/expressions/sentences/paragraphs in press releases referred to zero, one, or multiple 
policy issues (and this remark also implies that a strict rule for measurement units also proved to be un­
feasible). Therefore, an inclusive approach was adhered to even if it produced anomalies of overlapping 
policy issues as in the case all foreign exchange (FX) denominated loans (with no special reference to the 
non-performing loan [NPL] problem) and specifically the NPL aspect of this issue (which is significant in 
itself as the results show; see the second entry in the list). The comment section in ATLAS.ti served as the 
primary means in establishing issue boundaries in such cases, as it is presented on the right-hand module  
of the print screen. 
The introduction of a second rule was also necessary regarding the possible limits on codes per unit of 
observation. As press releases contained various numbers of issues ranging from zero to a dozen, the 
only rule applied was that only the first mention of an issue in a given press release counted (as yearly re­
ports are by definition a compilation of policy issues a similar rule was impractical in that case). This was 
important so that we could control for the diverging length and elaboration of specific press releases. 
A third methodological decision concerned the scope of a single policy issue. The first round of coding 
yielded 22 policy issues. Table 1, in contrast, shows the results of an in-between phase with some codes 
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already grouped into larger categories according to issue area such as "Taxes" (which is one step towards 
a topic-based conversion of all issue codes; it is notable, however, that ATLAS.ti code groups were re­
served for codes related to specific information sources: press releases and yearly reports). This classifica­
tion scheme also opened up new avenues for analysis for a comparison of issue areas as opposed to sin­
gle issues (we will get back to this point). 
In  the  event,  the  manual  coding  process  returned  a  relatively  stable  list  of  recurring  policy  issues. 
Variance in the technical level of exposition or the dynamics of the evolution of content was smoothed 
by the application of a few simple rules. One such rule sanctioned that if the non-performing element  
became more pronounced in the general FX loan crisis, this led to the creation of a separate issue code 
and the recoding of previous FX loan-related segments. This process was helped by the query system of 
ATLAS.ti as witnessed by Figure 4, which shows how documents slated for re-coding were selected by a 
search of their content for the keyword "deviza" (foreign exchange). 
Figure 4: Using the query tool to find documents slated for recoding
Let us now assume that an appropriate solution to the task of policy issue homogenization has been ar­
rived at. From the perspective of our research question the problem still remains that not all issues are  
created equal.  Table 1 refers to a number of policy issues related to taxation (see entry 6 and 8, for 
instance). Some of these issues concern the economy as a whole with only indirect consequences for the 
banking  sector  ("general  tax  reforms")  while  some  are  related  to  the  consumers  of  financial 
intermediaries  (specific  rules  of the personal  "income tax" regarding,  say,  interest  revenue).  A third 
category pertains to the revenue of the shareholders of financial institutions: various forms of corporate 
and bank taxation (see e. g., "special bank tax 2006"). 
For those in charge of the lobbying activities of banks these three types of issues related to taxation do 
not represent the same level of importance. In some cases even a pure financial analysis may be applica ­
ble: One form of taxation can cost the banking sector more than two other type of taxation taken  
together. This and similar anomalies are, on the one hand, at odds with our selection of policy issues as 
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the  unit  of  analysis  in  our  study  of  preference  attainment.  Re-conceptualizing  policy  influence  in 
monetary terms (profits gained or revenue loss avoided), on the other hand, may well upset our initial 
research design. 
Fortunately, all is not lost. Issues can be weighted according to various metrics. One is readily available 
from ATLAS.ti: code frequency is indicated in Table 1 under the title of "groundedness." Some issues also 
come equipped with uncontroversial metrics of importance (such as numerical monetary values), as is the 
case with the value of non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans. Finally, issue saliency may be  
accounted  for  by  expert  surveys  and  interviews  (see  Baumgartner  et  al.,  2009;  Bernhagen,  Dür  & 
Marshall, 2015). 
Based on these considerations advanced phases of the research design can focus on only the "big fish":  
issues that are above a threshold of importance by some specific metrics or a composite index thereof. 
This is also the path that we have chosen during the research process by selecting only "major" issues for 
further analysis. This importance indicator was constructed as a result of top 10 issues as measured by 
both the groundedness indicator  of ATLAS.ti  and the expert evaluation of the researcher.  The most 
salient issue in both cases was allocated 10 points and the least salient 1 point. The composite index pro ­
vided a rank order by adding the two saliency scores. 
Spatial Position And Success Rate Estimation From Various Sources 
Even  as  questions  related  to  issue  identification  are  resolved,  a  major  obstacle  remains  before  the 
progress of our research design. This concerns the core element of all preference attainment studies, the 
success rate of lobbying. In order to establish such a metrics of policy influence, policy positions have to  
be estimated for both the status quo and the ideal point of the interest group. This basic rule has to be  
adjusted for our present purposes as in most cases policy issues emerged as a result of a government pro­
posal with the aim of altering the status quo. 
Therefore, in this simplified account, there are two "sides" (Baumgartner et al, 2009: 46) to every story.  
These can be positioned in the standard one-dimensional policy space (along, say, the left-right spec­
trum) and the framework for analysis is set. In order to apply this conceptual scheme to our research 
question (the preference attainment of the HBA over time) a further position has to be placed on the 
spectrum: the policy outcome of the political process. From the relative alignment of these policy posi ­
tions a score of preference attainment can be extracted (in the research process this was labeled as the 
PrefScore).
While this spatial approach may sound easy in theory, its operationalization for empirical research is not 
without its challenges. First, we have seen before that the content of issues changes over time and so do 
the policy positions with regard to these issues. Which point in time should serve as the reference for es­
timating policy position? And on a related note:  Should the  reduction of a tax form be considered 
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lobbying success if the lobbying outfit itself was opposed to the introduction of this tax type in question 
from the very beginning? 
Second, the epistemological  status of various sources may differ when it  comes to calculating policy 
stances. Interest groups may have strategic motives in their public communications while internal docu­
ments are seldom accessible to researchers. Klüver (2012) used consultation submissions and compared 
them with the policy outcome, while Baumgartner et al. (2009) and Dür et al. (2015) relied on interviews 
and surveys. What to make of potential discrepancies between these sources of positional estimation? 
Third, the measurement of distance between seemingly non-quantifiable positions spawned an entire lit­
erature of spatial models of politics. Nevertheless, the ordinal scales used in this line of research are fairly  
crude in  capturing the numerical  degree  of  preference  attainment,  and so  is  the derivative  method 
adopted by Klüver (2012: 99) which counts as "success" all and any movement of the policy outcome 
towards the ideal point of the interest group. This binary approach was supplanted by PrefScore, our 
proposition of a success variable with three values: zero for failure; one for partial success; and two for  
"victory" (in this the technique follows the standard of empirical studies of the redemption of electoral 
pledges – see e. g., Thomson, 2011). 
Such a manual scoring of preference attainment—accompanied by intense memo-making that details the 
logic behind the scores—comes out as a viable alternative to more mechanical  approaches.  Table 1 
shows the preliminary scores for some salient issues in press releases. 
Issues (w/ some codes
consolidated)
N Estimation of HBA ideal policy position PrefScore
Bank tax 6 No new taxes on banking are supported (2010); 
Freeze the level of bank tax (2012)
0
Charge-free ATM withdrawal 1 Proposal is "damaging for society" and "branches 
close" because of it (2013-14)
0
Consumer finance "settlement", uni­
lateral interest rate increases, ER 
spread and banking "accountability"
11 Banking practices were legal and fair . It puts an 
"enormous burden on the sector"; it is retroactive 
and "against the rule of law" (2014)
0
Eviction ban 1 "Flawed measure" for summer months (2013) 1
Exchange rate cap 9 The decision is the result of the "hard work" and 
shared responsibility" of government, consumers and 
HBA
1
FX loans HUF conversion, early and fi­
nal repayment policies
14 The proposed "final repayment of FX loans gravely 
threatens the stability of the financial system and 
could lead to serious macroeconomic repercussions"
0
Financial transaction duty 3 Measure is against the 2011 agreement as "it will be 
paid by the banks" not the customers
0
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Issues (w/ some codes
consolidated)
N Estimation of HBA ideal policy position PrefScore
Municipal debt and reform 4 It may be "justified" in the case of small municipalit­
ies (2011); less so for bigger cities (2011-13)
1
National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA)
4 HBA "welcomes" the creation of NAMA (2011) 2
Positive debtor list and credit
information
1 The HBA has been supporting this policy "for more 
than a decade" (2010)
2
Table 1: Policy issues and HBA positions in press releases (2008-2014) 
By using the example of the first entry in  Table 1 (Bank tax) the analysis proceeded as follows. In the 
corpus of HBA press releases the issue of the bank tax was mentioned six times (N=6). In the code man­
ager of ATLAS.ti all relevant quotations were listed (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Quotations related to the issue of "bank tax"
This list also shows that the issue was present on the policy agenda for over four years (see Document  
column describing the date of the press release). This leads to another aforementioned methodological  
problem: policy positions change over time as they reflect a changing environment. Therefore, in this 
case, two separate signature quotations were extracted from these text segments. First, the Banking As­
sociation supported "no new taxes on banking" (2010). Second, and after the government had intro­
duced a new bank tax, they argued for "freezing the level of the bank tax (2012)." This is how the esti­
mation of the HBA ideal policy position was finalized with respect to the policy issue of the bank tax (see 
the third column of Table 1). 
In the final phase of the analysis the PrefScore (presented in the fourth column) was assigned based on 
the policy outcomes coded for the policy issue of the bank tax. As the new tax had indeed been intro­
duced and a subsequent freeze was not secured this issue points toward a lobbying failure (a PrefScore 
of "0") on behalf of the HBA.
In conclusion, and in terms of CAQDAS usage, the PrefScore distribution process was assisted by both 
the coding- and analysis-oriented features of ATLAS.ti. Signature quotes and supporting variables were 
obtained via the various manager and query tools for each PrefScore as described by Figures  2-5 and 
Table 1. 
Such an inclusion of multiple aspects of both activity and results allows for a more nuanced analysis of  
lobbying: ex ante policy positions may be corroborated by ex-post criticism of policy measures, and vice 
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versa. By linking various sources (press releases and professional reports) in ATLAS.ti through a common 
coding scheme, the inquiry also opens up for more fine-tuned analysis. 
One example of this complex coding approach is a further variable pointed towards sentiment (as op­
posed to positional) analysis (see again Figure 2). By including this aspect of HBA communications it be­
came clear that its press releases contain an overwhelmingly negative content both in describing policy 
outcomes in  general  and presenting Association positions  in  particular.  Co-occurrence  tables  (Friese, 
2014: 208) between variable pairs of interest (such as lobby forms and success rates) add another layer 
to the inquiry. For instance, from the exported Excel tables, a separate PrefScore could be calculated; not 
just for every issue but for every lobbying action (such as a call for negotiations, going to court etc.).
While such additional layers of analysis played their respective role in reaching PrefScores for various 
policy issues, decisions were still primarily rooted in spatial analysis as this serves the basis for studying 
preference attainment (as opposed to the competing approaches of attributed influence and process-
tracing). 
Discussion 
This paper reviewed a sample of the methodological problems associated with the empirical investigation 
of policy influence in the context of developed democracies. We peeked into the black box of research in 
order to shed light on some of the methodological decisions that tackle these problems—and specifically 
how CACQDAS such as ATLAS.ti may be helpful in mitigating them. 
In conclusion,  and in order  to  show the importance of such methodological  decisions  for  valid  and 
reliable research results, let us consider an example decision from our case study. 
Empirical results regarding preference attainment are highly sensitive to the level of issue aggregation 
(see  Table 2). From our research process it  became abundantly clear that empirical  results  regarding 
preference attainment are highly sensitive to the level of issue aggregation. Issue aggregation here refers 
to the problem of issue boundaries that we discussed above. The table provides an example of how the 
rules for issue aggregation have an effect on actual results.
Issues PrefScore Issue Areas PrefScore
Bank tax 0 Corporate and bank taxes 1
Charge-free ATM withdrawal 0 Consumer charges 1
Consumer finance "settlement", unilateral interest 
rate increases, ER spread and banking "accountability"
0 FX loans 1
Table 2: PrefScores for "Issues" vs. "Issue areas" level of aggregation
Table 2 shows how, with each step towards a more general notion of issues, the probability of partial  
success increases.
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In the case of the bank tax, the first row in Table 2, the single issue level analysis shows a lobbying fiasco 
(hence the PrefScore of 0). This is due to the aforementioned introduction and continued presence of the 
bank tax in the Hungarian tax system. 
The methodological  problem related to  issue boundaries,  however,  may turn this  failure  into  partial 
success. If we consider a more aggregate level of issues (not a specific tax, but general tax types), we  
have to add up all the lobbying successes and failure in the domain of corporate and bank taxes. As in  
some cases the HBA won, in some cases it lost, for the general issue area of corporate and bank taxes 
the result of our PrefScore is 1. This is how issue boundaries and researcher focus may lead to different 
results.
Similar comparative tables could be constructed for a number of related topics ranging from issue salien­
cy  [?]  to  the structure and rules  of  the PrefScore.  Needless  to  say,  it  is  exactly  these nuances  and 
subtleties that make analyzing qualitative data so intriguing. And in the final analysis they also make a 
clear case for methodologically informed research designs; and, above all, for transparency in presenting 
research methods, procedure, and results. 
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